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
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ΔΙΚΑΝΙΚΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ

IN EURIPIDES.

A DISSERTATION


*Presented to the Board of University Studies of the
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ΔΙΚΑΝΙΚΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ

IN EURIPIDES.

INTRODUCTION.

THE subject of this investigation was suggested by a passage in Aristophanes, *Eirene*, 533, 534 :

*οὐ γὰρ ἤδεται
αὕτη ποιητῇ ῥηματίων δικανικῶν.*

The *ποιητής* referred to is Euripides.¹ The attacks of the conservative Aristophanes on the liberal Euripides are too well known to require comment. Every work on Greek literature, and almost every edition of the plays of Euripides, inform us of this fact. The charge made in the passage quoted above doubtless contains much truth ; but whether it is to be regarded as a grave fault of Euripides or as an argument in his favor, since he tried to please his audience, scholars are by no means agreed. After the severe onslaught of Schlegel there was a united attack against Euripides, and scholars vied with each other in trampling him down ; but now we know that the harsh criticism of Schlegel was unreasonable, and the poet is in a fair way to receive justice.

In preparing this investigation, the long speeches in the plays of Euripides have been carefully studied for the purpose of selecting those which might be called forensic discussions, either in the form of a trial, where the plaintiff, defendant, and judge appear on the stage, or in a less formal court scene, as well as the persuasive and epideictic speeches.

¹ Cf. *Arist., Batr.*, 771 fg. Also *Quintilian*, 10, 1, 67 fg.

The subject thus includes the *γένος δικανικόν*, *γένος συμβουλευτικόν*, and *γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν*.¹

In literature the speech is as old as Homer. From the first speech in the *Iliad* until the end of the classical period the *ῥήσις* plays an important rôle in all the branches of Greek literature, with the single exception of the Lyric. Public speaking was indigenous; the Greeks were born speakers. The popular assembly and the eloquent orator were to them what the quiet room and the newspaper of to-day are to us. Theirs was a listening, ours is a reading public. It is but natural, therefore, that the speech, which was so important a factor in the life and development of the nation, should be of frequent occurrence in the Epos and the Drama, as well as in History and Philosophy.

In Aischylos the long *ῥήσεις* are generally delivered by a messenger who relates some action which has taken place at a distance, or by a stranger who gives a description of a far-off country and people. The tendency to argument is very slight, and generally no sooner is a discussion begun than it is ended. In the *Hept. Theb.*, 1026 fg., after a *ῥήσις* of sixteen lines by Antigone, the discussion is quickly brought to a close by a short *στιχομυθία* (1042 fg.). In the *Eumenides*, 443 fg., the trial of Orestes naturally leads to discussion; but the arguments are advanced by Orestes and by the chorus, hence would not produce the same effect on the audience as two long *ῥήσεις* delivered by individuals on the stage. The parties argue in *στιχομυθία*, vv. 588-606, and only Apollo, the advocate for Orestes, speaks at any length (*Eum.* 614-621, 625-639). The poet, therefore, shows a strong tendency to avoid long *ῥήσεις* in such discussions.

But when we come to Sophokles we find the rhetorical element in a more marked degree. This change is doubtless due to the fact that rhetoric and discussion had begun to occupy a more prominent place in Athenian life, and the

¹ Quintilian (II, 21, 23. III, 4, 1; 7, 1) informs us that Aristotle was the first to make this triple division of rhetoric. See also Dion. Hal., *De Lysia Iudicium*, 16.

advance in the economy of the drama by which Sophokles introduced three actors belongs to the same line of development. In at least four of the seven extant plays of Sophokles the rhetorical element is clearly discernible. The best example is in the *Antigone*, 639-680, 683-723, where the character of Haimon is manifestly that of an Athenian pleader. A discussion, which may be compared with many in the plays of Euripides, is found in *Soph., Elek.*, 516-551, 558-609. In this passage the ῥῆσις of Klytaimnestra has a distinctly rhetorical structure, and contains a προοίμιον, 516-522, as well as an ἐπίλογος, 549-551. The ῥῆσις of Elektra in reply is much longer, but the divisions are not so clearly defined. We also see a strong tendency to argument and discussion in *Soph., Ajax*, 1226-1263, 1266-1315, *Oid. Tyr.*, 380-403, 408-428. We may also add *Philok.*, 1004-1044, 1047-1062.

Clearly discernible in Sophokles, the rhetorical element becomes still more conspicuous in the dramas of Euripides. Tragedy and oratory, each a form of public speaking, began to be strongly attracted to each other. Oratory lent its schemes to tragedy, and the drama in turn affected oratory, as we see from many dramatic passages in the orators from Lysias in the earlier time to Aischines in the later. And as in Aischines we think that we can trace the effects of his early training as an actor, so in Euripides we can trace the fondness for argument and altercation to his early familiarity with sophistic methods, — to the influence of such men as Prodikos. At any rate, natural bent, sophistic training, tendency of the times, singly or combined, will suffice to explain the rhetorical speeches in nearly all the plays of Euripides. This peculiar feature of the plays of Euripides is more widely distributed than the "Agon of the Old Comedy."¹ In the comedies of Aristophanes there are three plays without an Agon;² while in the dramas of Euripides there is but one without a rhetorical scene.³ This is the *Iph. Taur.*, and even

¹ See Zielinski, "Die Gliederung der Altattischen Komödie," Leipzig, 1885. Also M. W. Humphreys, "The Agon of the Old Comedy," A. J. P. VIII, 179-206.

² *Acharnes*, *Eirene*, *Thesmophoriazousai*.

³ The *Rhesos* is not included.

in this drama, although it contains no long rhetorical *ρήσεις*, some of the short speeches approach very near to forensic discussion. Cf. especially vv. 597–608, 674–686, 687–715.¹

In the treatment of the rhetorical speeches a brief synopsis of the play has been given as far as the scene in which the discussion occurs; this scene is then treated more fully with a synopsis of the speeches of the plaintiff and defendant. The speeches have been divided, so far as it was found practicable, into the four divisions *προοίμιον*, *πρόθεσις*, *πίστεις*, *ἐπίλογος*, which every complete rhetorical speech contains.²

The discussion is often referred to by the word *ἄγών*,³ just as it is used to denote a trial or action at law in the orators.

In Herakl. 116, before the formal *ρήσεις* are delivered, the word is used :

πρὸς τοῦτον ἄγὼν ἄρα τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου
μάλιστα' ἂν εἴη.

In Orest. 491, it occurs in the first line of the first *ρήσις* :

πρὸς τόνδ' ἄγὼν ἂν τί σοφίας εἴη πέρι ;

Also after ten lines of the first *ρήσις* have been delivered in Andr. 328 :

δούλη κατέστης εἰς ἄγῶνα.

In Her. Main. 1311, it occurs in the lines of the chorus after the first *ρήσις* :

οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλου δαιμόνων ἄγὼν ὅδε
ἢ τῆς Διὸς δάμαρτος.

It occurs at the beginning of the second *ρήσις* in Hiket. 427 :

ἐπεὶ δ' ἄγῶνα καὶ σὺ τόνδ' ἡγωνίσω
ἄκου' ἄμιλλαν γὰρ σὺ προύθηκας λόγων.

¹ The latter may perhaps be divided into *προοίμιον* 687, 688, *πίστεις* 689–707, *ἐπίλογος* 708–715.

² See Aristotle, Ars. Rhet. III, 13 fg.; Dion. Hal., Ars. Rhet. c. X fg.; De Lys. Iudic. 17, 18, 19; Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, ch. 36; Rössler, Rhetorum Antiquorum de Dispositione Doctrina, p. 30 fg.

³ This word is used in Aristophanes to refer to the formal contest in comedy. See A. J. P. VIII, 183 (note).

In Andr. 234, it is used even after both *ρήσεις*, in the spirited debate which follows :

τί σεμνομυθεῖς κείς ἀγῶν' ἔρχει λόγων.

The *προοίμιον* can be clearly discerned in nearly all the longer rhetorical *ρήσεις*. Sometimes, however, it is hardly worthy of the name when the first few lines of the leading *ρήσις* are an answer to the previous words of the opponent. In a few passages it is omitted altogether, as, for example, Hek. 251, 1132 ; Her. Main. 170, 1313. The *προοίμιον* may be general or particular. There is no regular form or phrase used to introduce it, but in two *ρήσεις* we find the word itself used. Elek. 1060 :

λέγοιμ' ἄν· ἀρχὴ δ' ἦδε μοι προοιμίου.¹

Hekabe 1195 :

καί μοι τὸ μὲν σὸν ὥδε φροιμίοις ἔχει.

The *πρόθεσις* is generally found in the first *ρήσις* of a pair or series of speeches, but is omitted in Hek. 251, Elek. 1017, Ion 589, Orest. 495, Troad. 918. Sometimes it is scattered through the *πίστεις*, as in Alkest. 633 fg., Andr. 154 fg. In many *ρήσεις* it is somewhat argumentative, and extends into the *πίστεις* even where the division has been made. In such cases it is impossible to determine exactly the dividing line. On the other hand, it is regularly omitted in the second *ρήσις*, for either the first speaker has already stated the case, or the audience is acquainted with the facts from the preceding part of the drama. In this Euripides follows the custom of the orators, for with them the second speech on the same case has no *πρόθεσις*.

The *πίστεις* form the most important part of the discussion, and therefore regularly extend through the greater part of the *ρήσις*. This part is omitted but once,² Phoin. 493.

¹ Nauck brands the word *προοίμιον* as "absurdum."

² The speech in Hiket. 857-917 is a funeral oration, and hence contains no *πίστεις*.

The division between the *πρόθεσις* and *πίστεις* is often clearly defined by such words as *φέρε*, *ἄγε*, etc. As, for example, Andr. 333 :

Μενέλαε, φέρε δὴ διαπεράνωμεν λόγους.

Also Andr. 662 :

καίτοι φέρ', ἄψασθαι γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν λόγου.

Medeia 499 :

ἄγ', ὡς φίλῳ γὰρ ὄντι σοι κοινώσομαι.

The *πίστεις* are sometimes introduced by *πρῶτον* or *πρῶτα*. Hipp. 991 :

πρῶτα δ' ἄρξομαι λέγειν.

Hiket. 517 :

καὶ πρῶτα μὲν σε πρὸς τὰ πρῶτ' ἀμείψομαι.

Troad. 919 :

πρῶτον μὲν ἀρχὰς ἔτεκεν κ.τ.λ.

Occasionally the clew to the division is given by some other word, as in Iph. Aul. 381, *εἰπέ μοι*. Ion 589, *ἄκουσον*. Or in a more general way, as in Hek. 1196 :

πρὸς τόνδε δ' εἶμι καὶ λόγοις ἀμείψομαι.

Sometimes the speaker balances the arguments of his opponent with his own. Herak. 153 :

φέρ' ἀντίθες γάρ.

Orest. 551 :

δύο γὰρ ἀντίθες λόγῳ.

Phoin. 559 :

ἄγ', ἦν σ' ἔρωμαι δύο λόγῳ προθεῖς' ἄμα.

The end of the *πίστεις* can frequently be detected by some phrase, as, for example, Bak. 309 :

ἀλλ' ἐμοί . . . πιθοῦ.

The same words occur in Kyklops 309, Herak. 174.

The ἐπίλογος is rarely wanting.¹ Sometimes it is a brief statement that the speaker has said all that is of importance in defence of his case. It may be a *résumé* of the arguments or a statement of the speaker's position, as in Andr. 361 fg., 688 fg., Hipp. 971 fg., Iph. Aul. 400 fg., Troad. 961 fg. It may be a supplication for mercy, as in Herak. 226 fg.; or an address to a god, as in Med. 516 fg. Again it is almost proverbial, as Hek. 293 fg., Hiket. 506 fg. In Elek. 1049-50, the first speaker bids her opponent answer the arguments, and this is a conclusion to the ῥήσις.

The average length of the ῥήσις is a little less than fifty lines, but some of them exceed that number, as Andr. 590-641, Hek. 1132-1182, 1187-1237, Her. Main. 170-235, Hiket. 195-249, Iph. Aul. 1146-1208, Med. 465-519, 522-575, Orest. 544-604, Troad. 914-965, 969-1032, Phoin. 528-585. In some discussions the two ῥήσις exactly balance each other in the number of lines, as Hek. 1132-1182, 1187-1237, Elek. 1011-1050, 1060-1099, Herak. 134-178, 181-231,² Med. 465-519, 522-575. In Phoin. 469-585, we find the remarkable coincidence of twenty-seven lines by each of the disputants and fifty-six by Iocaste in reply, being almost exactly twice the number of each of the preceding ῥήσις. This universal tendency to balance, which in Greek became a law, must not, however, be pushed too far in these speeches, much less be considered as ground for textual criticism. To do so would be to reduce poetical genius to simply mathematical ingenuity. It is much better to consider them as does Johann Kvěčala (Eur. Stud. II, 81), who says (in his discussion of Hek. 1132-1182, 1187-1237): "Eine Uebereinstimmung der Verszahl dieser beiden Reden könnte, wenn die Ziffer 51 richtig ist, nicht für beabsichtigt gelten."

The two ῥήσις are generally separated from each other by two verses of the chorus, but this rule is violated in a few cases, as Andr. 641-645, Hek. 295-299, Hel. 943-947, Troad. 965-969, where we have three verses. In Her. Main. 169,

¹ See Andr. 180, Hek. 331, Helen 943, 995.

² Vv. 220-225 are doubtless interpolated.

the verses of the chorus do not occur. Two passages remain where the rule is apparently violated, — Elek. 1050–1060, which is discussed later, and Hek. 1182–1187.¹

In the translation of the *ρήσεις* the attempt has been made to choose typical speeches to illustrate our author, and to state briefly the leading lines of thought rather than to follow the text verbatim. The text of Nauck, 3 ed., Leipzig, 1885–1887, has been taken as the basis; but other editions have been freely consulted, and where other readings seemed preferable they have been adopted. Constant use has been made of Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's "Analecta Euripidea," and Nauck's "Euripideische Studien."

I. — Δικανικοὶ λόγοι.

A. — DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN TWO SPEAKERS IN THE PRESENCE OF A JUDGE.

1. HEKABE, 1114–1292. *Ρήσεις*, 1132–1182, 1187–1237.
Disputants, Polymestor and Hekabe.
Judge, Agamemnon.
2. HERAKLEIDAI, 120–287. *Ρήσεις*, 134–178, 181–231.
Disputants, Kopreus and Iolaos.
Judge, Demophon.
3. ORESTES, 470–716. *Ρήσεις*, 491–541, 544–604, 640–679, (682–716).
Disputants, Tyndareos and Orestes.
Judge, Menelaos.
4. TROADES, 895–1059. *Ρήσεις*, 914–965, 969–1032.
Disputants, Hēlen and Hekabe.
Judge, Menelaos.

¹ Hek. 1185, 1186, are rightly rejected by W. Dindorf. They are suspected by Kvíčala, Eur. Stud. II, p. 83.

ANALYSIS OF HERAKLEIDAI 120-287, AND TROADES 895-1059.

HERAKLEIDAI, 120-287. Ῥήσεις, 134-178, 181-231.

A sharp discussion occurs near the beginning of this play. Iolaos and the children of Herakles have been banished from Argos, and Eurystheus has sent a herald forbidding any city to receive them. The fugitives have just arrived at Marathon, and are found clinging to the altar in front of the temple of Zeus. At v. 55, Kopreus, the herald of Eurystheus, arrives, and is about to drag the suppliants from the altar when he is checked by the arrival of the chorus (v. 73). To the latter Iolaos tells his story and begs for protection (vv. 75-98). After a few words between Kopreus and the chorus, the latter bids him state the case to the king. Kopreus then asks (v. 114):

KO. τίς δ' ἐστὶ χώρας τῆσδε καὶ πόλεως ἄναξ;

XO. ἐσθλοῦ πατρὸς παῖς Δημοφῶν ὁ Θησέως.

Kopreus then declares the case shall be discussed before Demophon (vv. 116, 117). The arrival of Demophon, who is to be the judge, is immediately announced (v. 118 fg.), and the king having learned the cause of the trouble, asks for an explanation from Kopreus. This introduces the Ῥήσεις of the plaintiff and defendant.

Ῥήσις OF KOPREUS, 134-178.

1. Προσίμιον, 134, 135:

Ἀργεῖός εἰμι, τοῦτο γὰρ θέλεις μαθεῖν.
ἐφ' οἷσι δ' ἤκω καὶ παρ' οὐ λέγειν θέλω.

2. Πρόθεσις, 136-138:

πέμπει Μυκηνῶν δεῦρό μ' Εὐρυσθεὺς ἄναξ
ἄξοντα τούσδε· πολλὰ δ' ἦλθον, ὧ ξένε,
δίκαι' ὁμαρτῇ δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ἔχων.

3. Πίστεις, 139-174 :

a. 139-143. As a citizen of Argos I arrest Argive fugitives condemned by law to die, and we have a right to pass judgment upon our own subjects.¹

β. 144-146. To many other altars have they gone, but we have rested our case on these arguments, and no one has ventured to encounter danger by opposing us.

γ. 147-152. They have come here because they see some weakness of heart in you, or else because this is their last hope.

δ. 153-174. Come, weigh the arguments.² If you allow us to take them back, you can ally the great power of Argos to this city; but if you are weakened by their arguments,³ and admit them into your city, then the case is to be settled by the sword, and you have no good reason for making war.

4. 'Επίλογος, 174-178 :

But yield to my arguments,⁴ and, without cost — simply allowing me to take what belongs to me — gain Mykenai. Do not choose the worse when you can have the better friends.

At the close of Kopreus's speech, the chorus, reflecting the sentiment of an Athenian audience, asks (vv. 179, 180) :

τίς ἂν δίκην κρίνειεν ἢ γνοίη λόγον,
πρὶν ἂν παρ' ἀμφοῖν μῦθον ἐκμάθῃ σαφῶς ;

The words of the chorus are the signal for the defence.

¹ V. 143. Nauck reads ἀστοὶ κατ' ἀστῶν for αὐτοὶ καθ' αὐτῶν, but the change is not necessary.

² V. 153. φέρ' ἀντίθετος γάρ. Cf. Orest. 551, δύο γὰρ ἀντίθετος λόγῳ.

³ V. 158. Nauck follows F. G. Schmidt in reading γόους for λόγους of the MSS. Retain λόγους.

⁴ V. 174. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ. Cf. Bak. 309 ; Kyklops 309.

Ῥῆσις OF IOLAOS, 181-231.

1. Προοίμιον, 181-183 :

ἄναξ, ὑπάρχει μὲν τόδ' ἐν τῇ σῇ χθονί,
εἰπεῖν ἀκοῦσαι τ' ἐν μέρει πάρεστί μοι,
κούδεῖς μ' ἀπώσει πρόσθεν ὥσπερ ἄλλοθεν.

2. Πρόθεσις omitted.

3. Πίστεις, 184-219 :

a. 184-189 (ἐσμεν). We have nothing in common with this man, for he is Argive, but we are not, since we have been banished.

β. 189-196. Does banishment from Argos mean from all Greece? Not from Athens, at any rate. The Athenians will not drive away the children of Herakles through fear of the Argives.

γ. 197-204. If your arguments succeed, I declare that Athens is no longer free. But I know their nature, — they would rather die; for honor with the brave is considered of greater importance than life.¹


δ. 205-213. You ought to save these children because your father and theirs were born of first cousins,² hence you are related.

ε. 214-219. Besides relationship they have another claim upon you. Their father once rescued your father from the murky depths of Hades, as all Greece can testify.

¹ Cf. Plato, Krito 49 C, D ; Apol. 28 B-D.

² V. 211. Nauck reads ἐξανέψλω for MSS. αὐτανέψλω. The correction of Rezig αὐτανέψλων (= ἐξ αὐτανέψλων) is much better.

The relation of Demophon to the children of Herakles is as follows :



4. Ἐπίλογος, 226-231.¹

I beg of you do not refuse to receive the children of Herakles under your protection. Be to them a friend, father, brother, even master; for anything is better than to fall into the power of the Argives.

Πίστις OF KOPREUS.

- a. 139-143 answered
 β. 144-146 "
 δ. 153-174 "

Πίστις OF IOLAOS.

- a. 184-189.
 β. 189-196.
 γ. 197-204.

γ. 147-152 is too weak an argument to require an answer.

δ. 205-213, ε. 214-219, are independent arguments of Iolaos, which prove to be the strongest.

The decision of the judge is given in a few words (vv. 236, 237):

τρισαί μ' ἀναγκάζουσι συμφορᾶς ὁδοί,
 Ἰόλαε, τοὺς σοὺς μὴ παρώσασθαι ξένους.²

Demophon decides in favor of the suppliants for three reasons:

1. Vv. 238, 239. On the ground of religious obligation.
2. Vv. 240, 241. On the ground of relationship and gratitude.
3. Vv. 242-246. The honor of Athens demands it.

At v. 250, he turns to Kopreus and bids him return and tell Eurystheus the courts are open for him to settle his claims by law, but he cannot use force. Then follows a rapid cut and thrust between Demophon and Kopreus in a *στιχομυθία* of twenty verses (252-272). This form of dialogue generally closes such long discussions. At the close of the *στιχομυθία* the two disputants come so near to blows that the chorus interferes and bids Kopreus depart (v. 273 fg.).

¹ Vv. 220-225 are doubtless spurious. Vv. 221, 222 have evidently been taken from vv. 97, 98 of this play. Dindorf suspected vv. 223-225, and remarked that the words *βλέπον πρὸς αὐτοὺς βλέπον* (225) are taken from Alkest. 390.

² V. 237. Nauck, 3d ed., reads *λόγους* for *ξένους*.

The herald declares that Argos will make war on Athens (vv. 275-283), and Demophon angrily replies (vv. 284-287):

φθείρου· τὸ σὸν γὰρ Ἄργος οὐ δέδοικ' ἐγώ.
 ἐνθένδε δ' οὐκ ἔμελλες αἰσχύναις ἐμὲ
 ἄξειν βία· τούσδ' οὐ γὰρ Ἀργείων πόλει
 ὑπήκοον τήνδ' ἀλλ' ἐλευθέραν ἔχω.

This is one of the best court scenes in Euripides. The *ῥῆσις* of Kopreus contains the four principal divisions of an oration. The *προοίμιον* is very closely connected with the following division. The *πρόθεσις*, although short, is distinctly marked. Demophon has just arrived on the scene, and this gives the orator an excellent opportunity for making a statement of the case. The *πίστεις* consist of four divisions, and the poet, as a trained rhetorician would have done, puts the weakest argument in the middle (vv. 147-152). This argument proves to be of so little weight that the defendant treats it with silent contempt. The plaintiff reserves his strongest argument for the last, and dwells upon it to a considerable length (vv. 153-174), recounting all the disadvantages which will follow if the judge decides the case against him. The *ἐπίλογος* is of average length, and, as is frequently the case, concludes with a piece of wholesome advice.

In the *ῥῆσις* of the defendant the *προοίμιον* is an eulogy on Athens and her law courts, therefore an excellent introduction to his defence. The *πρόθεσις*, as usual in the *ῥῆσις* of the defendant, is omitted, because the judge is already acquainted with the circumstances of the case from the *ῥῆσις* of the plaintiff. In the *πίστεις* he answers the arguments of his opponent in the same order in which they were advanced, with the exception of γ. 147-152. After answering the arguments of the plaintiff, he wins his case by a skilful introduction of new arguments that could not be answered (vv. 205-219). The *ἐπίλογος* ends the *ῥῆσις* with an appeal to the judge for mercy and protection. It is somewhat longer than usual, but is not out of balance with the whole speech.

The clear and distinct manner in which the judge sums up the arguments and renders his decision should be especially noticed. His first reason for deciding in favor of the defendant is one which was barely touched upon by Iolaos (v. 196), but is the strongest argument in his own mind (vv. 238, 239). The two arguments advanced separately by Iolaos (vv. 205-213, 214-219) are combined by the judge and considered as one. The third reason for deciding as he does is a very common one, and is given in many similar situations both in actual trials and in other plays of the poet.

TROADES, 895-1059. *Ῥήσεις*, 914-965, 969-1032.

Troy has fallen, and the Trojan women have been assigned to the various leaders of the Greeks. Menelaos appears (v. 860) for the purpose of taking Helen to Greece, where she is to be put to death on account of the evils she has caused (vv. 876-879). At v. 895 Helen appears, and when informed she must die (vv. 901, 902), asks :

*ἔξεστιν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀμείψασθαι λόγῳ,
ὥς οὐδ' ὀρθῶς, ἢν θάνω, θανούμεθα ;*

To this Menelaos replies :

οὐκ εἰς λόγους ἐλήλυθ', ἀλλὰ σε κτενῶν.

But it is unjust for a person to be executed without a trial ; and since Hekabe (who happens to be present) believes she can persuade Menelaos that Helen ought to die, she asks that the defendant be granted a hearing, after which she herself will make the *ῥήσις* of the prosecution, and Menelaos can then sum up the arguments and render his decision (vv. 906-910). We have then a criminal case involving capital punishment. Helen, as defendant, pleads her own case ; Hekabe answers her arguments ; and Menelaos, as judge, renders his decision.

Ῥῆσις OF HELEN, 914-965.

1. Προϊμιον, 914-918 :

Since you consider me an enemy, perhaps you will not answer my arguments. But I will answer the charges which I think you will bring against me.¹

2. Πρόθεσις omitted.

3. Πίστεις, 919-960 :

a. 919-922. In the first place, this woman was the direct cause of the evils because she gave birth to Paris, and Priam destroyed Troy because he did not kill his son.

β. 923-931 (κάλλει). Paris was the judge of the three goddesses. Pallas promised him Hellas; Hera promised him Asia and the confines of Europe;² Kypris, admiring my form, promised me to him if she won the prize for beauty. (Hence she is implicated.)

γ. 931-937. Kypris won the prize, and thus my marriage saved Hellas, since you are not subject to the barbarians. Hellas has been fortunate, but I (the cause of this) am condemned.

δ. 938-950. You will say that I do not touch upon the real question, viz., that I left your palace by stealth. I reply, that the evil genius of this woman, call him Alexander or Paris,³ came with a powerful goddess as his ally. Charge the crime to her. Even Zeus is her slave.

ε. 951-960. You may maintain that after the death of Alexander I ought to have returned to the Greeks. This I tried to do, as the guards can bear witness, but I was forcibly detained by Deiphobos as his wife.

¹ Vv. 916 fg. A case of προκατάληψις. Cf. 951 fg.

² V. 928. Nauck rejects this verse, and says (Eur. Stud. II, p. 150): "Der eingeklammerte Vers gehört zu den absurdesten Fabricaten, mit denen jemals irgend ein Dichter besudelt worden ist."

³ V. 942. For καὶ Πάριον Nauck would read εἴτ' ἀλάστορα. See his exhaustive comment on this verse in Eur. Stud. II, pp. 150-159.

4. Ἐπίλογος, 961-965 :

πῶς οὖν ἔτ' ἂν θνήσκοιμ' ἂν ἐνδίκως, πόσι,
 πρὸς σοῦ δικαίως, ἣν ὁ μὲν βία γαμεί,
 τὰ δ' οἴκοθεν κείν' ἀντὶ νικητηρίων
 πικρῶς ἐδούλευσ' ; εἰ δὲ τῶν θεῶν κρατεῖν
 βούλει, τὸ χρήζειν ἀμαθές ἐστί σοι τόδε.

Ῥήσις OF HEKABE, 969-1032.

1. Προοίμιον, 969, 970 :

ταῖς θεαῖσι¹ πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι
 καὶ τίγνδε δείξω μὴ λέγουσαν ἔνδικα.

2. Πρόθεσις omitted.

3. Πίστεις, 971-1028 :

a. 971-982. I do not believe that Hera and Pallas are so foolish as to subject Argos and Athens to Phrygia. Their rivalry in regard to beauty was mere sport, and you cannot make that an argument in your defence.

β. 983-997. You maintain that Kypriis assisted my son, but it was your own passion. All folly is attributed to Ἀφροδίτῃ by mortals, and rightly does the name of the goddess begin the word ἀφροσύνη.² Barbarian gold and splendor led you astray.

γ. 998-1009. Again you say my son took you by force. Who heard your cries as you were carried away? When you came to Troy your affections changed as the fortunes of battle wavered between the two armies.

δ. 1010-1028. You declare that you tried to escape from Troy, but could not. On the contrary, I often urged you to leave the city, but this did not please you, for you preferred to be worshiped by barbarians.³

¹ V. 969. ταῖς θεαῖσι MSS. Nauck, 3d ed., reads τοῖς θεοῖσι. See Aristotle, Rhet. III, 17, 15.

² V. 990. "Ἔστι δ' ἄλλος . . . τόπος . . . τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος . . . ὡς ἡ Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβῃ εἰς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην" — καὶ τοῦνομ' ὀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἀρχει θεᾶς. Aristot. Rhet. II, 23, 29.

³ "Vv. 1020-1022 graviter laborant." Nauck. In Eur. Stud. II, p. 160, he suggests an improvement as follows :

4. Ἐπίλογος, 1029-1032 :

Μενέλα', ἵν' εἰδῆς οἱ τελευτήσω λόγον,
στεφάνωσον Ἑλλάδ' ἀξίως τήνδε κτανὼν
σαυτοῦ, νόμον δὲ τόνδε ταῖς ἄλλαισι θεῖς
γυναιξί, θνήσκειν ἥτις ἂν προδῶ πόσιν.

Πίστεις OF HELEN.

Πίστεις OF HEKABE.

β. 923-931	answered	β. 983-997.
γ. 931-937	"	α. 971-982.
δ. 938-950	"	γ. 998-1009.
ε. 951-960	"	δ. 1010-1028.

Menelaos did not enter the court-room as an impartial judge, for his decision had been already made (v. 905). He did not hear the arguments for the purpose of giving Helen an opportunity of escaping sentence of death, but simply because he had leisure to hear both sides of the case (v. 911). This is, then, a court scene, with arguments advanced and answered as in a regular trial, but is really no trial at all. In other words, Euripides saw a fine opportunity for pleasing his audience with a mere farce of a trial, and so made the speakers present the arguments. The verdict of the judge after the *ρήσεις* of the defendant and plaintiff is but a repetition of his former determination. He agrees with Hekabe in thinking that Helen left Sparta of her own accord, that her argument in regard to Kypris is but *κόμπου χάριν* (v. 1038), and therefore she shall die (vv. 1036-1041). Helen makes a last appeal for mercy, but it is of no avail (vv. 1042, 1043). He orders the servants to conduct her to the ship, and after a few words with Hekabe the scene closes.

The *ρήσεις* of Helen contains three of the four usual divisions, the *πρόθεσις* being omitted. In the *προοίμιον* she fears that her opponent may not answer her arguments, but declares she will make her defence whether she is answered or not. The *πίστεις*, as we should expect in a case where the

ἐν τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου γὰρ ὑβρίζειν ὁμοίως
καὶ προσκυνεῖσθαι βαρβάρων ὑπηρέταις
μέγ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν σοι (οἱ ἡγοῦ).

defendant's life is at stake, extend through nearly the whole of the *ῥήσις*. First, Helen endeavors to shift the responsibility for the evils consequent upon her marriage to Paris back to the parents of her Trojan husband. Then she maintains that Kypri is responsible for her actions, and introduces a sophistic argument in her defence. By her elopement with Paris she maintains that Greece was rescued from falling into the hands of the barbarians. In the last division of the *πίστεις* she introduces and answers a plausible argument which may be advanced by her opponent. Her *ῥήσις* presents several distinct cases of *προκατάληψις*. In the *ἐπίλογος* she turns directly to Menelaos, whom she addresses as husband, and makes an appeal for justice.

The *ῥήσις* of Hekabe in reply is in harmony with the passionate nature of the aged ex-queen of Troy. She plunges at once "in medias res." Passing over the first argument of Helen, which is in fact so ridiculous as to be no argument at all, she first answers the weakest argument, which her opponent had shrewdly placed in the middle of her *ῥήσις*. Of this reply Aristotle (*Rhet.* III, 17, 15) says, *ἤψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου*. She then takes up and answers each of Helen's arguments, and in the *ἐπίλογος* addressing Menelaos, as Helen had done, urges him to act in a manner worthy of himself.

By comparing the arguments of Helen with Gorgias' *Encomion*, we find some very interesting coincidences. In v. 924 fg. Helen says:

ἔκρινε τρισσὸν ζεύγος ὅδε τριῶν θεῶν.
καὶ Παλλὰδος μὲν ἦν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δόσις
Φρυγί στρατηγοῦνθ' Ἑλλάδ' ἐξανιστάναι,
Ἥρα θ' ὑπέσχετ' Ἀσιάδ' Εὐρώπης θ' ὄρους
[τυραννίδ' ἔξειν, εἴ σφε κρίνειεν Πάρις].
Κύπρις δὲ τοῦμόν εἶδος ἐκπαγλουμένη
δώσειν ὑπέσχετ', εἰ θεὰς ὑπερδράμοι
κάλλει. τὸν ἐνθένδ' ὥς ἔχει σκέψαι λόγον.
μικᾷ Κύπρις θεά.

And in v. 940 :

ἦλθ' οὐχὶ μικρὰν θεὸν ἔχων αὐτοῦ μέτα
ὁ τῆσδ' ἀλάστωρ.

Also in v. 948 fg. :

τὴν θεὸν κόλαζε καὶ Διὸς κρείσσων γενοῦ,
ὃς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων δαιμόνων ἔχει κράτος,
κείνης δὲ δοῦλός ἐστι. συγγνώμη δ' ἐμοί.

Finally, in vv. 964, 965 :

εἰ δὲ τῶν θεῶν κρατεῖν
βούλει, τὸ χρῆζειν ἀμαθὲς ἐστί σοι τόδε.

This argument of Helen is quite summarily disposed of by Hekabe in v. 988 fg., but Gorgias with his sophistry defends Helen on the same grounds, and tries to prove that she is entirely free from guilt. For, says he (Gorg., Encom. Hel. 6) :

**Ἡ γὰρ τύχης βουλήμασι καὶ θεῶν βουλευμασι καὶ ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν ἔπραξεν ἢ ἔπραξεν, ἢ βία ἄρπασθείσα, ἢ λόγοις πεισθείσα, ἢ ἔρωτι ἀλούσα. Εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἄξιος αἰτιᾶσθαι ὁ αἰτιώμενος. θεοῦ γὰρ προθυμίαν ἀνθρωπίνην προμηθεῖα ἀδύνατον κωλύειν. πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρεῖσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρεῖσσονος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρεῖσσον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἥσσον ἔπεσθαι. θεὸς δ' ἀνθρώπου κρεῖσσον καὶ βία καὶ σοφία καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ οὖν τῇ τύχῃ καὶ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον, τὴν Ἑλένην τῆς δυσκλείας ἀπολυτέον.*

Also in sec. 15 :

εἰ γὰρ ἔρωσ ἦν ὁ ταῦτα πάντα πράξας, οὐ χαλεπῶς διαφεύξεται τὴν τῆς λεγομένης γεγονέναι ἀμαρτίας αἰτίαν. ἢ γὰρ ὀρώμεν, ἔχει φύσιν οὐχ ἦν ἡμεῖς θέλομεν ἀλλ' ἦν ἕκαστον ἔτυχε· διὰ δὲ τῆς ὀφειῶς ἢ ψυχῇ καὶ τοῖς τρόποις τυποῦται.

In sec. 19 he finishes his arguments thus :

εἰ οὖν τῷ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης ὄμμα ἦσθ' ἢ προθυμίαν καὶ ἄμιλλαν ἔρωτος τῇ ψυχῇ παρέδωκε, τί θαυμαστόν; ὃς εἰ μὲν θεὸς (ὦν ἔχει) θεῶν θείαν δύναμιν, πῶς ἂν ὁ

ἦσσαν εἶη τοῦτον ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀμύνασθαι δυνατός; εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὥς ἀμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὥς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον· ἦλθε γὰρ οἷς ἦλθε τύχης ἀγρεύμασιν, οὐ γνώμης βουλευμασί, καὶ ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις, οὐ τέχνης παρασκευαῖς.

Compare the argument of Helen before Theonöe in Eur. Hel. 929 fg. :

ἦν δ' Ἑλλάδ' ἔλθω κἀπιβῶ Σπάρτης ποτέ,
κλύοντες εἰσιδόντες ὥς τέχναις θεῶν
ᾤλουτ', ἐγὼ δὲ προδότις οὐκ ἤμην φίλων.

Also the remarkable statement made by the "deus ex machina" in Elek. 1282 fg. :

Ζεὺς δ', ὥς ἔρις γένοιτο καὶ φόνος βροτῶν,
εἶδωλον Ἑλένης ἐξέπεμψ' ἐς Ἴλιον.

Such arguments as the above were common enough among the sophists at Athens in Euripides' time, and no doubt the poet drew from them in this *ῥήσις* of Helen as well as in other speeches, especially the *ῥήσις* of Kassandra in Troad. 353-405, where the sophistic element is at its highest in Euripides.

B.—DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN TWO OR MORE SPEAKERS.

1. ALKESTIS, 614-738. 'Ρήσεις, 629-672, 675-705.

Disputants, Admetos and Pheres.

2. ANDROMACHE, 147-746. 'Ρήσεις, 147-180, 183-231, 319-363, (384-420), 590-641, 645-690, (693-726).

Disputants, Hermione and Andromache; Andromache and Menelaos; Menelaos and Peleus.

3. BAKCHAI, 210-369. 'Ρήσεις, 266-327, 330-342.

Disputants, Teiresias, Kadmos, and Pentheus.

4. KYKLOPS, 203-355. 'Ρήσεις, 285-312, 316-347.

Disputants, Odysseus and Kyklops.

5. ELEKTRA, 998-1140. 'Ρήσεις, 1011-1050, 1060-1096.
Disputants, Klytaimnestra and Elektra.
6. HERAKLES MAINOMENOS, 140-251; 1229-1357. 'Ρήσεις,
140-169, 170-235; 1255-1310, 1313-1339.
Disputants, Lykos and Amphytryon; Herakles and Theseus.
7. HIPPOLYTOS, 902-1101. 'Ρήσεις, 936-980, 983-1033.
Disputants, Theseus and Hippolytos.
8. IPHIGENEIA EN AULIDI, 317-414. 'Ρήσεις, 334-375,
378-401.
Disputants, Menelaos and Agamemnon.
9. MEDEIA, 446-626. 'Ρήσεις, 465-519, 522-575.
Disputants, Medeia and Jason.
10. ION, 517-675. 'Ρήσεις, 585-647.
Disputant, Ion.

ANALYSIS OF ELEKTRA, 998-1140; HIPPOLYTOS, 902-1101; AND
MEDEIA, 446-626.

ELEKTRA, 998-1140. 'Ρήσεις, 1011-1050, 1060-1096.

After the murder of Agamemnon by Klytaimnestra, the latter gave her daughter in marriage to a poor farmer, and closed the doors of her palace to Elektra and Orestes. Klytaimnestra is afterwards summoned to the country, the messenger alleging that Elektra has just been delivered of her first-born. At v. 998 the queen arrives in grand style with her attendants before the humble cottage of Elektra. She here meets the daughter, who immediately accuses her mother of banishing Orestes and herself from the palace of their murdered father. This causes Klytaimnestra to enter into a long argument in defence of herself, to which Elektra replies.

Ῥῆσις OF KLYTAIMNESTRA, 1011-1050.

(Vv. 1011, 1012 are an answer to the preceding words of Elektra.)

1. Προόμιον, 1013-1017:

λέξω δέ· καίτοι δόξ' ὅταν λάβῃ κακὴ
 γυναῖκα, γλώσση πικρότης ἔνεστί τις·
 ὥς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς· τὸ πρᾶγμα δὲ
 μαθόντας, ἦν μὲν ἀξίως μισεῖν ἔχῃ,
 στυγεῖν δίκαιον· εἰ δὲ μή, τί δεῖ στυγεῖν;

2. Πρόθεσις included in the πίστεις.

3. Πίστεις, 1018-1048:

a. 1018-1023. Tyndareos gave me in marriage to your father, but not that my husband might kill my children, which he did; for he allured my daughter from home to Aulis by a promise of marriage to Achilles, and there put her to death.

β. 1024-1029. If he had killed her to prevent the capture of a city, or to save the rest of his children, it would have been pardonable, but he did it on account of the wantonness of Helen and the laches of her husband.

γ. 1030-1034. Although I felt deeply injured by that act, I would not have killed my husband, had he not returned with a raving, god-possessed young dame to share his bed.

δ. 1035-1040. Women are foolish, I grant; but when a husband neglects his home-duties, it is natural for the wife to imitate him and secure another lover. She then has all the blame.

ε. 1041-1048. If Menelaos had been secretly carried away from home, ought I to have sacrificed Orestes in order to save my sister's husband?¹ How would your father have regarded that? Ought he not to die, since he killed my daughter?

¹ Example of παράδειγμα. Cf. Orest. 507 fg.

4. Ἐπίλογος, 1049, 1050 :

λέγ' εἴ τι χρίζεις κἀντίθες παρρησία
ὅπως τέθηκε σὺς πατήρ οὐκ ἐνδίκως.

After a few words have passed between Elektra and Klyt-
taimnestra (vv. 1055-1059), the former delivers a ῥῆσις in
reply to the above arguments.

Ῥῆσις OF ELEKTRA, 1060-1096.

1. Προοίμιον, 1060, 1061 :

λέγοιμ' ἄν· ἀρχὴ δ' ἦδε μοι προοιμίου.¹
εἴθ' εἶχες, ὦ τεκοῦσα, βελτίους φρένας.

2. Πρόθεσις included in the first part of the πίστεις.

3. Πίστεις, 1062-1093 (ζῶσαν) :

a. 1062-1068. Helen and yourself are worthy of praise in
regard to beauty, but you are both sinful and unworthy of
Kastor, for she left her husband² willingly,³ and you have
killed the noblest man of Greece under the pretext of aveng-
ing your daughter's death.

β. 1069-1075. Before your daughter's death, as soon as
your husband had departed from home, you began to arrange
your auburn locks in front of the mirror. The wife who
takes pains with her toilet when her husband is away from
home has some wickedness in view.

γ. 1076-1085. You alone of all the Grecian dames were
filled with joy when the Trojans were successful, but when
they were defeated you were downcast because you did not
wish Agamemnon's return from Troy.⁴

δ. 1086-1093 (ζῶσαν). What wrong have I and my brother
done to you? After killing your husband, why did you not
share our father's home with us rather than marry again?

¹ V. 1060. "προοιμίου absurdum." Nauck. J. Kvíčala (Eur. Stud. I, p. 73)
suggests προοίμιον.

² V. 1065. ἀπέχετο for ἀπόλετο of the MSS. is Pierson's conjecture, now
generally accepted.

³ Cf. this statement with Troad. 373, 998.

⁴ Retain v. 1079.

Your present husband is not banished to avenge your son, nor is he killed to avenge me, although I suffer a living death at his hands.

4. 'Επίλογος, 1093 (εἰ δ')-1096 :

εἰ δ' ἀμείψεται
φόνον δικάζων φόνος, ἀποκτενῶ σ' ἐγὼ
καὶ παῖς Ὀρέστης πατρὶ τιμωρούμενοι·
εἰ γὰρ δίκαι' ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τὰδ' ἐνδίκαια.¹

After a short conversation between Klytaimnestra and Elektra, in the course of which the usual *στιχομυθία* is used rather sparingly (1116-1123, 1128-1131), the scene closes with the departure of Klytaimnestra to offer sacrifice.

The *ῥήσις* of Klytaimnestra contains three distinct and separate divisions, the *πρόθεσις* being included in the first part of the *πίστεις*. The *προοίμιον* is general except v. 1015 — *ὥς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν* — by which the general statement is applied to herself. In the *πίστεις* we find four arguments advanced in defence of her crime. The last of these is a remarkable hypothetical case which corresponds in every particular to the real one, and to this hypothesis it is implied there can be but one answer. The *ἐπίλογος* is short, and simply an invitation to the opponent to answer the arguments advanced.

In the *ῥήσις* of Elektra the *προοίμιον* is very short and to the point. In the first verse the word *προοίμιον* occurs, which is found in but one other passage in the rhetorical *ῥήσεις* of Euripides. In Hek. 1195 it occurs at the end of the *προοίμιον*. In the *πίστεις* Elektra has not followed the order of the arguments of her mother. In fact it cannot be said that she has answered any one of the arguments clearly and distinctly. She barely touches upon an answer to β. 1024-1029 in the words *σκήψιν προτείνουσ'*, κ.τ.λ. (1067 fg.), but

¹ Kirchhoff and Nauck rightly bracket vv. 1097-1101. The *ῥήσις* ends far better with v. 1096 than with v. 1099. Cf. τὰδ' ἐνδίκαια (1096) with οὐκ ἐνδίκως (1050).

says not a word in direct reply to γ. 1030-1034 and ε. 1041-1048. However, it must be said that the ῥῆσις as a whole is an answer to that of Klytaimnestra, because other arguments are advanced to account for the crime committed by the defendant. So indirectly Elektra answers γ. 1030-1034 and δ. 1035-1040 by stating (1069 fg.) that her mother was false to Agamemnon long before he brought Cassandra to his palace. The ἐπίλογος is a peculiar one. It is the decision of a judge rather than the conclusion of a ῥῆσις. Elektra has tried her mother, as it were, and found her guilty of murder. She therefore renders judgment against her and sentence of death.

Vv. 1051-1056, generally given to Elektra, have caused the commentators much trouble. Nauck's change — δίκην ἔλεξας· σὴ δίκη for δίκαι' ἔλεξας, ἡ δίκη (1051) — helps us but little, and we had better retain the reading of the MSS. Wilamowitz, *Anal. Eur.* p. 71, after quoting these verses, says:

"Ab Electra iusta protulisse Clytaemnestram dici non posse intellexerunt, correxerunt igitur, varium et inprobabilem in modum. 1054 et 55 cohaerere non docuerunt. 'Ces vers ont été mal divisés, puis mal corrigés' dicit Weilius inprobabilia molitus, vere, at alio quam voluit sensu. 1051-1054, *chori sunt*. 1055, 1056, *Electrae*."

This is a satisfactory explanation of a very troublesome passage. Besides the objection given by Wilamowitz, it cannot be explained why the poet should make the second speaker give her opinion of the arguments of her opponent at the very beginning, then check herself after four verses, and remind her mother of the last words of the previous ῥῆσις. There is not a parallel to this in all the rhetorical ῥήσεις of Euripides. There is no doubt that vv. 1051-1054 are far better adapted to the chorus, as reflecting the opinion of the audience, than they are to Elektra, and it is the general rule for the chorus to have two or more verses between such ῥήσεις.

HIPPOLYTOS, 902-1101. 'Ρήσεις, 936-980, 983-1033.

This play contains two long forensic *ρήσεις* by Theseus and Hippolytos, with an introduction in the form of a dialogue between father and son (vv. 903-935). After the arguments have been presented by plaintiff and defendant, the discussion closes with a series of distichs, vv. 1064-1089.

Phaidra, the second wife of Theseus, has fallen in love with Hippolytos, the son of Theseus by his first wife. After learning that her love has been disclosed by an old nurse and spurned by Hippolytos, she writes a letter, incriminating the young man, and then commits suicide. Theseus soon arrives, and after reading the letter is very angry. At v. 902 Hippolytos appears, and innocently asks what is the cause of the disturbance. The reply of Theseus (v. 916 fg.) is couched in general terms, and takes the form of an invective against men who seem to be friends but are really foes (vv. 925-931). These general statements convey to Hippolytos sufficient meaning to arouse his suspicion, and he asks (v. 932 fg.) :

ἀλλ' ἡ τις εἰς σὸν οὖς με διαβαλὼν ἔχει
φίλων, νοσοῦμεν δ' οὐδὲν ὄντες αἴτιοι ;

Theseus now speaks out clearly, and makes the definite charge against his son.

'Ρήσις OF THESEUS, 936-980.

1. Προοίμιον, 936-942 :

If man's audacity continues to increase, the gods must add another earth to the present one, in order to have a place for the impious and base.

2. Πρόθεσις, 943-945 :

σκέψασθε δ' εἰς τόνδ', ὅστις ἐξ ἐμοῦ γεγὼς
ἦσχυνε τὰμὰ λέκτρα κάξελέγχεται
πρὸς τῆς θανούσης ἐμφανῶς κάκιστος ὢν.

3. Πίστεις, 946-970 :

a. 946-957. Look in your father's face. Do you boast of

association with gods and of chastity? I have no faith in your boasts and Orphic rites.¹

β. 958-965. She is dead. Do you think this will save you? It is the most convincing proof of all. This is stronger evidence than all ὄρκοι and λόγοι.

γ. 966-970. Do you say that folly is in woman's nature but not in man's? Young men are no stronger against temptation than women are when Kypris distracts their mind.

4. Ἐπίλογος, 971-980:

νῦν οἶν τί ταῦτα σοῖς ἀμιλλῶμαι λόγοις
νεκροῦ παρόντος μάρτυρος σαφεστάτου;

Begone, and leave my realms! If I allow myself to be defeated by you, my reputation will be lost.

Ῥῆσις OF HIPPOLYTOS, 983-1033.

1. Προοίμιον, 983-991 (ἀφεῖναι):

The case (of my opponent) has fair arguments until one examines it closely. I am no orator to harangue the people,² but nevertheless I must speak out in my own defence.

2. Πρόθεσις omitted.

3. Πίστεις, 991 (πρῶτα)-1024:

a. 991-1006. I will begin by answering your first charge. I revere the gods, and treat my friends the same at all times. I am wholly innocent of the charge, and have never touched woman.

β. 1007-1020. If you do not believe I am innocent, you should prove me guilty. Did I wish to usurp your throne? I should be foolish to do so. But (you say) "it is sweet to

¹ Vv. 952, 953. Nauck (Eur. Stud. II, p. 38) recommends the following reading:

στίτοις νῦν αὔχει καὶ δι' ἀψύχου βορᾶς
ἰὼν καπήλευ', Ὀρφέα τ' ἀνακτ' ἔχων.

² Vv. 988, 989. Arist. Rhet. II, 22, 3: φασὶν οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους παρ' ὀχλῷ μουσικωτέρως λέγειν. Cf. also Plut., de Educ. Lib. 9, 6 B.

afterwards became enamored of Glauke, the daughter of Kreon, and Medeia was ordered by the king to depart from Korinth with her two children. After Medeia has been sentenced by the king to banishment, Jason appears, accuses her of having unduly abused the royal family, and declares that for this reason she has been banished. He comes, however, with the offer of pecuniary aid for their children (vv. 448-458). Medeia charges him with injustice and inconstancy, and delivers a bitter invective against him. He replies in a *ρήσις* of about the same length.

Ῥῆσις OF MEDEIA, 465-519.

1. Προοίμιον, 465-474 :

You utter wretch, you have come, have you ?¹ This is not courage or boldness, to look in the face of friends you have injured, but the greatest evil among men, — insolence.

εὖ δ' ἐποίησας μολών,
ἐγὼ τε γὰρ λέξασα κουφισθήσομαι
ψυχὴν κακῶς σε καὶ σὺ λυπήσει κλύων.

2. Πρόθεσις, 475-498 :

ἐκ τῶν δὲ πρώτων πρῶτον ἄρξομαι λέγειν.

I saved your life when you were sent to overcome the fire-breathing bulls, and I slew the dragon that guarded the golden fleece. I deserted home and kindred to come with you to Iolchos. After receiving such favors, you have deserted me and taken another wife. You have broken the oaths you made before the gods, and I am ruined.

3. Πίστεις, 499-515 :

a. 499-508. Come, I will converse with you as a friend, — although expecting no advantage, — because when questioned you will appear the greater villain. Where now shall I turn? To the home I abandoned? To the sad daughters of Pelias? A fine reception they would give me after killing their father. I have made enemies of my friends to help you.

¹ V. 468 is probably interpolated from v. 1324. Klotz, however, defends it.

β. 509-515. For this you have made me a happy wife indeed, and a wonderful husband I have in you if, as an exile, I am driven away to wander with my children.

4. Ἐπίλογος, 516-519:

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ χρυσοῦ μὲν ὃς κίβδηλος ἦ
τεκμήρι' ἀνθρώποισιν ὥπασας σαφῆ,
ἀνδρῶν δ' ὅτφ χρὴ τὸν κακὸν διειδέναι,
οὐδεὶς χαρὰ κτῆρ ἐμπέφυκε σώματι;

Ῥῆσις OF JASON, 522-575.

1. Προοίμιον, 522-525:

I must not be slow to answer, but as a skilful pilot with close-reefed sail,¹ I must escape from the violent storm of your words.

2. Πρόθεσις omitted.

3. Πίστεις, 526-567:

α. 526-533. I consider that Kypris was the person who saved me.² Subtle and shrewd are your arguments, but it was Eros that forced you to assist me. This point, however, I will not press too closely.

β. 534-544. You have received more than you gave, as I will prove. You live in Greece instead of among barbarians. You enjoy the advantage of justice and law, and are not subject to mere force.³ You have gained a reputation among the Greeks which otherwise you would not have.

Vv. 545, 546:

τοσαῦτα μέν σοι τῶν ἐμῶν πόνων πέρι
ἔλεξ'. ἄμιλλαν γὰρ σὺ προύθηκας λόγων.⁴

γ. 547-567 (ὀνῆσαι). You blame me because I married into the royal family. In answer I will say that I was (1)

¹ See the scholiast and Elmsley for a different interpretation of this passage.

² Vv. 526-528. Nauck reads ἐπεὶ σὴν for ἐπειδὴ; also σωτηρίας ναύκληρον for ναυκληρίας σώτειραν. See Nauck, Eur. Stud. I, p. 120.

³ V. 538. κράτος, Nauck. Retain χάριν of the MSS. and cf. Soph. Antig. 30.

⁴ V. 546. Cf. Suppl. 428.

wise, because I could not have gained a greater advantage (vv. 551-554); (2) prudent, in that I was not influenced simply by a desire for a new wife (vv. 555-558); (3) a friend to you and my children, because we could rise from poverty to wealth (vv. 559-567).

4. Ἐπίλογος, 567-575. It is the thought of your bed that grates upon your feelings.

χρῆν ἄρ' ἄλλοθεν ποθεν βροτοῦς
παῖδας τεκνοῦσθαι, θῆλυ δ' οὐκ εἶναι γένος.
χοῦτως ἂν οὐκ ἦν οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις κακόν.

Ῥῆσις OF MEDEIA.

Πίστεις OF JASON.

Πρόθεσις	{ 475-487	answered	a. 526-533.
	{ 488-498	"	β. 534-544.
Πίστεις	β. 509-515	"	γ. 547-567.

The *προοίμιον* in the *ῥῆσις* of Medeia is an answer to the insulting language of Jason immediately preceding, and at the same time an introduction to the *πρόθεσις*. In this *ῥῆσις*, as in that of Menelaos in Iph. en Aul. 337 fg., we find an elaborate *πρόθεσις*, in which Medeia relates the past actions of Jason and her assistance to him. The *πίστεις* contain little that can be called argumentative. It is not her purpose to persuade him to relent, but rather to prove him to be the utter wretch that he is. We should notice particularly vv. 475, 545, 546, as distinctly marking the dividing lines of the parts of the *ῥῆσις*. The *ἐπίλογος* of Medeia is excellent, and may be compared with the best in any of the speeches.

Jason's speech is rather an *ἄδικος λόγος*, but Euripidean sophistry gives him a fairly good argument. Almost the whole *ῥῆσις* is occupied with answering the numerous charges of Medeia, and in endeavoring to prove that his conduct is justifiable. His arguments in vv. 551-567, where he tries to prove that he has shown *σοφίαν*, *σωφροσύνην*, and *φιλίαν* in his course of action, would be almost amusing did they not pertain to such a serious question and involve still more serious consequences. The *προοίμιον* and *ἐπίλογος*, as well as

the several parts of the *πίστεις*, are clearly defined and set forth with the skill of a practised lawyer.

II. — Δικανικοὶ καὶ Συμβουλευτικοί.

PARTLY DISCUSSION AND PARTLY PERSUASION.

1. HEKABE, 218-437. *Ῥήσεις*, 251-295, 299-331, 342-378.
Disputants, Hekabe and Odysseus.
Pleader, Polyxena.
2. HIKETIDES, 87-584. *Ῥήσεις*, 163-192, (195-249), 297-331, 334-364, (409-425), 426-462, 465-510, 513-563.
Pleaders, Adrastus and Aithra.
Judge, Theseus.
Disputants, Herald and Theseus.
3. IPHIGENEIA EN AULIDI, 1106-1275. *Ῥήσεις*, 1146-1208, 1211-1252.
Disputant, Klytaimnestra.
Pleader, Iphigeneia.
Judge, Agamemnon.
4. PHOINISSAI, 446-637. *Ῥήσεις*, 469-496, 499-525, 528-585.
Disputants, Polyneikes and Eteokles.
Mediator, Iokaste.

ANALYSIS OF PHOINISSAI, 446-637.

The two sons of Oidipous, Eteokles and Polyneikes, having agreed to rule Thebes year by year alternately, the younger withdrew for a year. But at the end of the first year Eteokles proved false to his promise, and would not relinquish the rule. Polyneikes thereupon formed an alliance with Adrastus, king of Argos, and after collecting an army marched against Thebes. When the invading army appeared before the walls of the city, Iokaste, the mother of the rival claim-

ants, persuaded them to meet and try to settle their dispute. Polyneikes then enters the city, and the brothers state their case in the presence of Iokaste.

Ῥῆσις OF POLYNEIKES, 469-496.

1. Προοίμιον, 469-472:

Truth is simple, and justice needs no cunning language, but a false argument requires sophistic expedients.¹

2. Πρόθεσις, 473-493:

a. 473-483. To avoid the curse of Oidipous I voluntarily left this land, after agreeing with Eteokles that we should each rule a year in turn, and thus avoid enmity and bloodshed.² He has not kept his oath, but holds the sovereignty and my share of the ruling power.

β. 484-493. Even now I am willing to dismiss the army if I am granted my rights, and after ruling my allotted time I will resign. If this be not granted, I shall try to gain it by force of arms, and I call the gods to witness the justice of my cause.

3. Πίστεις omitted.

4. Ἐπίλογος, 494-496:

ταῦτ' αὖθ' ἕκαστα, μήτηρ, οὐχὶ περιπλοκάς
λόγων ἀθροίσας εἶπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφοῖς
καὶ τοῖσι φαύλοις ἔνδιχ', ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.

Ῥῆσις OF ETEOKLES, 499-525.

1. Προοίμιον, 499-502:

εἰ πᾶσι ταὐτὸ καλὸν ἔφυ σοφὸν θ' ἅμα,
οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις·
νῦν δ' οὐθ' ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἴσον βροτοῖς,
πλὴν ὀνόμασιν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὐκ ἔστιν τόδε.

2. Πρόθεσις omitted.

¹ This προοίμιον is quoted by Stobaeus, Flor. XI, 12. Compare the thought with Hek. 1187-1194.

² Nauck rightly suspects v. 480. See Eur. Stud. I, p. 76.

3. Πίστεις, 503-520:

a. 503-508. I would do all in my power to gain the greatest gift of the gods, — sovereignty, — and I am unwilling to resign it to another.

β. 509-514. It is cowardly to lose the greater and accept the less. I should feel ashamed, and the citizens of Thebes would reproach me, if I should yield to my brother when he has come in arms.

γ. 515-520. He ought to have offered to settle the question by arbitration rather than enforce his claims by arms. If he wishes to live here as a citizen he may do so, but I will never consent¹ to become his subject.

4. Ἐπίλογος, 521-525:

Therefore come fire, sword, and chariot, for I will not give up my sovereignty.

εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι
κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τᾶλλα δ' εὐσεβεῖν χρεών.

Ῥήσις OF IOKASTE, 528-585.

1. Προοίμιον, 528-530:²

ὦ τέκνον, οὐχ ἅπαντα τῷ γήραϊ κακά,
Ἐτεόκλεες, πρόσσεστιν· ἀλλ' ἡμπεριρία
ἔχει τι λέξαι τῶν νέων σοφώτερον.

2. Πρόθεσις omitted.

3. Πίστεις, 531-583:

a. 531-548.³ (Addressed to Eteokles.) Why do you court distinction, the greatest evil of the gods, which has destroyed many homes and cities? It is far better to respect the law of equality, which binds friends to friends, cities to cities, and has established fair dealing among men. Even night and day proceed in equal rounds, and neither one is envious of the other.

¹ V. 519. Retain μεθήσομαι of the MSS.

² This προοίμιον is also quoted by Stobaeus, Flor. XV, 1.

³ Cf. Dio Chrysost. XVII, p. 287.

β. 549-557. Why do you prize sovereignty so highly? It is but prosperity with injustice, — an empty honor. Why toil laboriously when you have much at home?¹ Wealth is but a name, and riches belong not to men, but to the gods.

γ. 558-565. I propose to you two alternatives. Do you prefer to rule or to save the city? Do you say you prefer to hold the throne? Then, if he is victorious, you will see Thebes conquered and many captive maidens ruined by your enemies.

δ. 568-583:²

σοὶ μὲν τάδ' αὐδῶ, σοὶ δὲ Πολύνεικες λέγω.

(Addressed to Polyneikes.) Adrastus has not wisely conferred his favors, and you are foolish for coming to destroy the city. Suppose you take the city — Heaven forbid! — how can you inscribe upon the spoils:

“Θήβας πυρώσας τάσδε Πολυνείκης θεοῖς
ἀσπίδας ἔθηκε;”

On the other hand, if you are defeated, how can you return to Argos after leaving the dead? Many will say:

“ὦ κακὰ μνηστεύματα
Ἀδραστε προσθεῖς, διὰ μιᾶς νύμφης γάμον
ἀπωλόμεσθα.”

4. Ἐπίλογος, 584, 585:

μέθετον τὸ λῖαν, μέθετον· ἀμαθίαι δυοῖν,
εἰς ταῦθ' ὅταν μόλητον, ἔχθιστον κακόν.

The arguments of Iokaste, powerful as they are, have no effect on Eteokles. He declares that words can accomplish nothing in the present contest (588, 589), and orders his brother to leave the city (593). This causes a very passionate debate to take place between the brothers in a series of trochaic verses (594-624). At first the debate is conducted in στιχομυθία (596-602), but as their anger increases they change to ἡμιστίχια, and thus continue to the end (603-624).

¹ V. 552. Retain ἐν δώμασι of the MSS. On εὐδαίμονα (the reading of Nauck) see Eur. Stud. I, 78.

² Dindorf rightly condemns vv. 566, 567. Nauck puts v. 567 in brackets.

In vv. 625–635 Polyneikes calls upon the gods to witness the injustice he receives, and as he departs Eteokles exclaims :

ἔξιθ' ἐκ χώρας · ἀληθῶς δ' ὄνομα Πολυνείκην πατήρ
ἔθετό σοι θεία προνοία νεικέων ἐπώνυμον.

There are several points in the above *ρήσεις* that are worthy of special attention. The most striking peculiarity is the length and arrangement of the three speeches. The *ρήσις* of Polyneikes is exactly the same length as that of his brother. The two *ρήσεις* taken together contain about the same number of verses as one *ρήσις* in other discussions. In the *ρήσις* of Polyneikes also the *πίστεις* are wanting. The *πρόθεσις* is the part that is generally omitted, but here we find the whole *ρήσις* is practically limited to the *πρόθεσις* or *διήγησις*. The *ρήσις* of Eteokles, on the other hand, is nearly all occupied with the *πίστεις*. The poet has skilfully placed the best arguments last, in order to leave as good an impression as possible of this unjust side of the case. The *προοίμιον* and *ἐπίλογος* are clearly defined in each *ρήσις*. Another peculiar feature is that Iokaste is not a judge to decide the contest, but acts as mediator, and the *ρήσις* which she delivers is almost exactly the length of both the preceding combined. She addresses the last speaker first, refutes every argument he has advanced, then turns to the first speaker and urges him not to make war on his own city. Her arguments, however, are of no avail.

The scholiast has the following interesting observation on the *ρήσις* of Iokaste :

ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲν Ἰοκάστη συμβεβούλευκε τοῖς παισὶ κοινω-
φελές. ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν λέγει, εἰς τί φιλοτιμῇ τυραννεῖν ; τῷ δέ,
εἰς τί πολεμεῖς τὴν πατρίδα ; ἐχρῆν δὲ τούτοις συμβουλευσai,
διελομένους τὰ πατρῶα, καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν παύσασθαι τῆς
διχοστασίας, ὅπως ὑπέστησαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνὰ μέρος ἄρχειν.
καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ ποιητῇ ἦν ποιῆσαι αὐτοὺς μὴ πειθομένους,
ὅπως τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας μένη βέβαια. εἵμαρτο γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀλλη-
λοκτόνους γενομένους, κατὰ τὰς ἀρὰς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποθανεῖν.
νῦν δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων πεποίηκεν.

III. — Συμβουλευτικός.

PERSUASION WHOLLY.

I. HELEN, 865-1029. 'Ρήσεις, 894-943, 947-995, 998-1029.

Pleaders, Helen and Menelaos.

Judge, Theonöe.

IV. — Ἐπιδεικτικός.

I. TROADES, 353-405.

Speaker, Kassandra.

V. — Ἐπιτάφιοι.

I. HIKETIDES, 857-917.

Speaker, Adrastos.

2. TROADES, 1156-1206.

Speaker, Hekabe.

DIVISIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL SPEECHES IN EURIPIDES.

ALKESTIS.

προίμιον	πρόθεσις	πίστις	ἐπιλογος
629-633	633-668	669-672
675-680	681-702	703-705

ANDROMACHE.

147-154	155-180
183-191	192-228	229-231
319-323	324-329	333-360	361-363
645-654	657-661	662-687	688-690

BAKCHAI.

266-271	272-287	288-321	322-327
330-332	333-340	341-342

HEKABE.

.....	251-285	286-295
299-300	301-331
.....	342-348	349-368	369-378
.....	1132-1136	1136-1174	1175-1182
1187-1194	1195-1232	1232-1237

HELEN.

προίμιον	πρόθεσις	πίστις	ἐπιλογος
.....	894-943
.....	947-995

ELEKTRA.

1011-1017	1018-1048	1049-1050
1060-1061	1062-1093	1093-1096

HERAKLEIDAI.

134-135	136-138	139-174	174-178
181-183	184-219	226-231

HERAKLES MAINOMENOS.

140-143	144-164	165-169
.....	170-173	174-226	227-235
1255-1257	1258-1298	1299-1310
.....	1313-1337	1338-1339

HIKETIDES.

163-167	168-183	184-189	190-192
297-300	301-325	326-331
.....	409-422	423-425
426-428	429-455	456-462
465-466	467-475	476-505	506-510
513-516	517-557	558-563
857-859	860-908	909-917
1080-1086	1087-1107	1108-1113

HIPPOLYTOS.

936-942	943-945	946-970	971-980
983-991	991-1024	1025-1033

IPHIGENEIA EN AULIDI.

334-336	337-365	366-372	373-375
378-380	381-399	400-401
1146-1147	1148-1165	1166-1205	1206-1208
1211-1215	1216-1248	1249-1252

ION.

585-589	589-644	644-647
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KYKLOPS.

285-289	290-309	309-312
316-317	318-344	345-346

MEDEIA.

προοίμιον	πρόθεσις	πίστις	ἐπίλογος
465-474	475-498	499-515	516-519
522-525	526-567	567-575

ORESTES.

491-495	496-533	534-541
544-548	549-599	600-604
640-641	642-677	678-679

TROADES.

353-364	365-369	370-402	403-405
914-918	919-960	961-965
969-970	971-1028	1029-1032
1156-1157	1158-1199	1200-1206

PHOINISSAI.

469-472	473-493	494-496
499-502	503-520	521-525
528-530	531-583	584-585

RHETORICAL INDEX TO THE SPEECHES OF EURIPIDES.

- ***Ἀναδίπλωσις**; Alk. 677, Andr. 319, 650, 651, (656), 678, Hek. 328, Hel. 916, 952, Herak. (225), 229, Hiket. 857, 1108, 1109, Iph. Aul. 1174, 1175, 1252, Kykl. 322, Phoin. 536, 537, 552.
- ***Ἀναφορά**; Her. Main. 143, 144, 148-150, 170, 171, 1301, 1316, 1317, Med. 467, Phoin. 521, 585.
- ***Ἀντίθεσις**; Alk. 685, 692, Hiket. 902, 908, Med. 469-472 (*et passim*).
- Εἰκότα**; Bak. 288 fg., Elek. 947, 1036, Hek. 271 fg., 282, 1207, Her. Main. 1314 fg., Ion 594-611, Hipp. 1008, Orest. 532.
- Εἰρωνεία**; Alk. 699 fg., Med. 472, 504, 510, Troad. 353 fg., 365 fg., 386 fg.
- ***Ἐλάττωσις**; Andr. 186, Hek. 1237, Med. 532, Orest. 544, Troad. 384.
- ***Ἐλεγχος**; Alk. 640, 679 fg., 696, Elek. 1069 fg., Hek. 1199 fg., Herak. 184 fg., Her. Main. 162, 190 fg., Hipp. 944, Iph. Aul. 335, Med. 566.
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